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Abstract
Critical systems must be designed resilient to the loss of control authority over
some of their actuators. This paper investigates the design of resilient linear systems
capable of reaching their target even after one or multiple actuators started to produce
uncontrolled and undesirable inputs. In contrast with the setting considered by robust
control, where perturbations are unknown, we consider undesirable inputs produced by
a faulty actuator belonging to the system and thus observed in real time. The control
inputs can then depend on these undesirable inputs. Building on our previous work,
we establish two novel sufficient conditions for resilient reachability. We then focus
on designing resilient systems able to withstand the loss of one or multiple actuators.
Since resiliency refers to the existence of a control law driving the state to the target,
we naturally continue with the synthesis of such a control law. We conclude with a
numerical application of our theory on the ADMIRE fighter jet model.
Index terms— Linear systems, Reachability analysis, Control design, Reliability,
Redundancy.
I Introduction
Loss of control is the major factor behind fatal aircraft accidents [1]. That is why such
critical systems must be able to operate safely even after sustaining actuator failures. This
paper is a continuation of our initial work in [2] and discusses design of resilient systems
able to withstand the loss of control authority over any actuator, and still be able to reach
their initial target. Redundancy is the key to guarantee the resiliency of a system, as proven
by NASA during the space race [3]. However, redundancy of subsystems does not always
guarantee safety [4] as it increases the complexity of the overall system. Resiliency has
also become a key issue in other fields like manufacturing [5] or integrated circuits [6]. In
comparison with the bulk of such work specific to certain systems, our approach focuses on
general linear systems.
∗Jean-Baptiste Bouvier and Melkior Ornik are with the Department of Aerospace Engineering and the
Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA.
e-mail: bouvier3@illinois.edu & mornik@illinois.edu
This work was supported by an Early Stage Innovations grant from NASAs Space Technology Research
Grants Program, grant no. 80NSSC19K0209.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
13
82
0v
2 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  2
5 J
un
 20
20
Among the types of system malfunction, we specifically consider the loss of control author-
ity over actuators. This setting has been introduced in [7] and refers to actuators becoming
unmanageable and producing undesirable, uncontrolled outputs. For instance, a damaged
rudder flapping in the wind produces undesirable outputs and it cannot be turned off like
a defective engine. Such an actuator malfunction is not covered by the definition of actua-
tor failure, which considers actuators performing with a reduced amplitude or with a fixed
unknown magnitude and has been widely studied, e.g., [8, 9].
To handle systems enduring undesirable inputs, the field of robust control aims at guaran-
teeing strong reachability, i.e., finding a control driving the system state to the desired target
for any perturbation, and has been widely studied by, e.g., [10, 11, 12, 13]. However, our
setting of interest does not feature unknown generic perturbations, but undesirable inputs
from one of the very own actuators of the system. In that case, real-time input measure-
ments are usually available, rendering robustness unnecessarily conservative, and calling for
a different type of reachability.
Namely, we say that a target is resiliently reachable from an initial state if for any
undesirable inputs, there exists a control law — possibly dependent on current undesirable
inputs, but with no knowledge of future ones — able to drive the system to the target. While
not referring to it as resilient reachability, [14] and [15] considered this setting but developed
complex algorithms stating whether a target is resiliently reachable or not. To design resilient
systems, we need a deep understanding and intuition about resilient reachability that only
an analytical theory can provide. The work of [16] transformed the problem of resilient
reachability into a minimax optimization problem assessing whether a target set is reachable.
Based on the latter work, [2] established simple reachability conditions for linear and mostly
driftless systems. However, [2] did not investigate the resiliency of systems to the loss of
control of any actuator.
As a first step towards a more general theory of resilient systems, the bulk of the results
of this paper focuses on the case of driftless systems. Our objective is to design linear
driftless systems resilient to the loss of control authority over some of their actuators. The
contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, based on [2] we introduce the notion of
resilient control matrices, and we derive straightforward verification criteria. Second, we
investigate the minimal degree of overactuation necessary to design a resilient system. Third,
we establish several methods to design resilient systems. Fourth, we synthesize a control law
driving a resilient system’s state to its target despite actuator failure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the problems
of interest and states the related definitions. In Section III we introduce the necessary
preliminary results previously obtained in [2]. In Section IV we develop the notion of resilient
control matrices and describe how to generate them. Section V focuses on the synthesis of a
control law for resilient systems. We illustrate our theory in Section VI with three scenarios
featuring a model of a fighter jet undergoing loss of control authority. In Appendix A we
provide examples of resilient matrices with a low degree of overactuation. Appendix B
gathers the technical details of the comparison between our approach and a robust control
method.
Notation: The identity matrix of size n is denoted In. The transpose of a matrixM isM
>,
a positive semidefinite matrix is denoted by M  0 and a positive definite matrix by M  0.
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The eigenvalues of a square matrix M are gathered in λ(M) := {z : det(zI −M) = 0}. The
singular values of a matrix M are the σM ≥ 0 such that det ((σM)2I −M>M) = 0, and
σMmax = max
√
λ(M>M).
The vector ei is composed of zeros except its i
th element is one. The column vector
z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Rn has a norm ‖z‖ =
√∑
z2i . We use 〈·, ·〉 to denote the inner product
between vectors.
The set of integers from 1 to n is denoted by [n]. The unit sphere in Rn is denoted
by U =
{
x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖ = 1} , while BX(c, ε) = {x ∈ X : ‖x − c‖ ≤ ε} is the ball of
center c and radius ε in the space X. The ellipsoid of center c and shape matrix P  0 is
E(c, P ) = {x : (x− c)>P (x− c) ≤ 1}.
The space of square integrable functions u : [0, T ]→ Rm is denoted by L2
(
[0, T ], Rm
)
or
simply L2, and contains all functions with a finite L2-norm: ‖u‖2 =
∫ T
0
‖u(t)‖2dt.
Operators Tr and det respectively denote the trace and the determinant of a matrix. To
obtain the real part of a complex number we use the operator Re : C→ R. The quantifiers
∃ and ∀ denote “there exists” and “for all”, respectively. For K ≤ m ∈ N, we denote the
number of K-combinations among m elements with the binomial coefficient
(
m
K
)
.
II Problem Statement
Consider a system governed by the differential equation
x˙ = Ax+ B¯u¯, x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn, (1)
where A ∈ Rn×n and B¯ ∈ Rn×m are constant matrices with n and m ∈ N. Assume that
the control specification is one of reachability. In other words, let G ⊂ Rn be the target ball
of radius ε ≥ 0 around xgoal ∈ Rn to be reached by the system. Assume that during its
mission the system loses control authority over p of its m actuators, with p ∈ [m]. These
p actuators are then producing uncontrolled and undesirable inputs. We can separate the
controlled inputs u ∈ Rm−p from the undesirable inputs w ∈ Rp by writing u¯ = (u>, w>)
and B¯ = [B C], with B ∈ Rn×(m−p) and C ∈ Rn×p. The system’s dynamics can thus be
rewritten as follows:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + Cw(t), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn. (2)
The technical work of this paper follows the assumptions of [2, 16] by considering square
integrable inputs. Namely, if U is the set of admissible control laws and W is the set of
undesirable inputs, we consider
U =
{
u ∈ L2
(
[0, T ], Rm−p
)
: ‖u‖ ≤ 1} = BL2(0, 1),
W =
{
w ∈ L2
(
[0, T ], Rp
)
: ‖w‖ ≤ 1} = BL2(0, 1), (3)
G =
{
x ∈ Rn : ‖x− xgoal‖ ≤ ε
}
= BRn(xgoal, ε).
We want to determine what kind of system is still able to reach its target after a loss of
control over some actuators. We can now define a resilient system as follows
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Definition 1: The system (A, B¯) following the dynamics (1) is resilient to the loss of control
authority over the p actuators represented by C if for any target ball G and any undesirable
input w, there exists a control law uw that drives the system following (2) from x0 to G.
We note that, as in [2], the control law uw can depend on the undesirable input w. Unlike
the concept of strong reachability in classical robust control [10, 11, 12, 13], the objective
is not to a priori design a control law working for any perturbation, but instead to have a
control law for each undesirable input. Since the undesirable inputs are generated by an
actuator belonging to the system, we assume their real-time measurement is available to
the controller. Therefore, resilient reachability guarantees that whatever the undesirable
inputs are, there is a control law dependent on the undesirable inputs driving the system to
its target. The intuitive expectation behind this dependency is that such a controller can
handle undesirable inputs of a larger magnitude than a standard robust controller. We now
formulate our three main objectives.
Problem 1: Establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a driftless system B¯ to be
resilient to the loss of any single or multiple actuators.
The work in [2] does not tackle resilient systems and thus is not completely addressing
Problem 1. Since a resilient system can operate with fewer actuators than in its nominal
configuration, we have the intuition that such a system must be initially overactuated.
Definition 2: A system is overactuated if the control matrix B¯ has strictly more columns
than rows.
Problem 2: Determine the minimal degree of overactuation required to build a resilient
driftless system.
Since the definition of a resilient system calls for the existence of a control law, we are
naturally led to our third objective.
Problem 3: For a resilient system sustaining an undesirable input w, synthesize a control
law uw that drives the system’s state x(t) to the target G.
We now introduce results previously proved in [2] that will be required to pursue the
investigation of resilient reachability.
III Preliminaries
The first results obtained in [2] concern resilient reachability at a certain time.
Definition 3: The target G is resiliently reachable at time T from x0 if for any undesirable
inputs w ∈ W , there exists a control law uw ∈ U that drives the system following (2) to
x(T ) ∈ G.
In the case where the matrix B is invertible the problem of resilient reachability becomes
trivial. Indeed, the control law uw = −B−1Cw would completely counteract the undesirable
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inputs. However, we are interested in general matrices B. We focus at first on driftless
systems, i.e., where the state equation (2) becomes
x˙(t) = Bu(t) + Cw(t), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn. (4)
For those systems, the work in [2] offers a straightforward expression to evaluate reachability
at a certain time.
Theorem 1: G is resiliently reachable at time T from x0 if and only if
max
h ∈ U
{
〈h, x0 − xgoal〉 −
√
T
∥∥B>h∥∥+√T ∥∥C>h∥∥} ≤ ε.
The condition in Theorem 1 is simplified in [2] with the definitions of d = x0 − xgoal and
of the function
J(h, t) := 〈h, d〉+√t( ∥∥C>h∥∥− ∥∥B>h∥∥ ).
Theorem 1 only states whether G is reached exactly at T . The situations where the target
must instead be reached before a time limit, call for resilient reachability by time T .
Definition 4: The target G is resiliently reachable by time T if there exists a time t ≤ T at
which G is resiliently reachable.
Then, [2] described reachability by time T as a minimax problem. The target G is
resiliently reachable from x0 by time T if and only if min
t ∈ [0,T ]
{
max
h ∈ U
{
J(h, t)
}} ≤ ε.
The function
g(h) := ‖C>h‖ − ‖B>h‖ for h ∈ U, (5)
leads to J(h, t) = h>d + g(h)
√
t. For a given goal and initial state, ‖h>d‖ is bounded. So,
as time grows,
√
t becomes the leading term in J , with its sign determined by g(h).
Theorem 2: The following statements hold:
(a) If max
h ∈ U
{
g(h)
}
< 0, there exists a time tlim such that G is resiliently reachable at time
t for all t ≥ tlim.
(b) If max
h ∈ U
{
g(h)
}
> 0, there exists a time tlim such that G is not resiliently reachable at
time t for all t > tlim.
(c) If max
h ∈ U
{
g(h)
}
= 0, the resilient reachability of G depends on the distance d.
The function g can be upper bounded with the maximal singular value of C>, denoted
by σC
>
max and with the minimal singular value of B
>, denoted by σB
>
min.
Proposition 1: max
h ∈ U
{
g(h)
} ≤ σC>max − σB>min.
We have now summarized the results derived in [2] required to pursue our investigation.
Before addressing Problem 1, we need to introduce two new results, a necessary and a
sufficient condition for resilient reachability.
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Theorem 3: For F := BB> − CC>, the following statements hold:
(a) If F  0, there exists a time tlim such that G is resiliently reachable at time t for all
t ≥ tlim.
(b) If F  0, there exists a time tlim such that G is not resiliently reachable at time t for
all t > tlim.
Proof: The statement (a) is equivalent to Theorem 2 (a):
max
h ∈ U
g(h) < 0⇐⇒ ∀ h ∈ U, ‖C>h‖ − ‖B>h‖ < 0
⇐⇒ ∀ h ∈ U, h>CC>h < h>BB>h
⇐⇒ ∀ h ∈ U, 0 < h>Fh
⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ Rn\{0}, 0 < x
>Fx
‖x‖2
⇐⇒ F  0.
And similarly, statement (b) is equivalent to Theorem 2 (b):
max
h ∈ U
g(h) > 0⇐⇒ ∃ h ∈ U : ‖C>h‖ − ‖B>h‖ > 0
⇐⇒ ∃ h ∈ U : h>CC>h > h>BB>h
⇐⇒ ∃ h ∈ U : h>Fh < 0
⇐⇒ F  0. 
The conditions of Theorem 3 are easier to verify than those of Theorem 2. We have thus
obtained simple analytical conditions concerning the resilient reachability of a target. We
are now able to tackle Problem 1.
IV Resilient Control Matrices
A driftless system is entirely described by its control matrix B¯. Thus, our overarching idea
is to link the resiliency of a driftless system to the properties of its control matrix.
When losing control authority over K of the m actuators of the system, we remove the
corresponding columns j1, . . . , jK from B¯ to form the matrix C and we name B the remaining
control matrix. We can now define a K-resilient control matrix.
Definition 5: The control matrix B¯ ∈ Rn×m is K-resilient if for all pairwise distinct
j1, . . . , jK ∈ [m] the system following the driftless dynamics (4) can resiliently reach any
target ball.
The degree of resiliency of the matrix B¯ is the highest K for which B¯ is K-resilient.
Definition 5 implies that if a control matrix is K-resilient, then it is also (K-1)-resilient. On
the other hand, if a control matrix is not K-resilient, then it is not (K+1)-resilient either.
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IV.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for K-resiliency
Based on our previous work, we derive two necessary and sufficient criteria to verify if a
control matrix is resilient.
Proposition 2: The control matrix B¯ ∈ Rn×m is K-resilient if and only if max
h ∈ U
g(h) < 0
for all pairwise distinct j1, . . . , jK ∈ [m], with g(h) = ‖C>h‖ − ‖B>h‖.
Proof: If max
h ∈ U
g(h) < 0 for all pairwise distinct indices j1, . . . , jK ∈ [m], then from Theorem
2, any target ball is resiliently reachable by the system of dynamics (4), so B¯ is K-resilient.
On the other hand, assume that B¯ isK-resilient. For all pairwise distinct j1, . . . , jK ∈ [m],
the continuous function g reaches a maximum gmax over the compact set U. If gmax > 0,
then from Theorem 2 (b) after some time, any target ball becomes not resiliently reachable,
which contradicts the resiliency of B¯. If gmax = 0, then from Theorem 2 (c) there are some
balls that are not resiliently reachable. It also contradicts the resiliency of B¯. Therefore,
gmax < 0. 
Computing the maximum of each function g can be difficult. Thus, we employ Theorem
3 to simplify the result of Proposition 2. As previously, we create C by removing K columns
from B¯, indexed by j1, . . . , jK and call B the remaining control matrix.
Proposition 3: The matrix B¯ is K-resilient if and only if F = BB> − CC>  0 for all
pairwise distinct j1, . . . , jK ∈ [m].
Proof: The result follows directly from Proposition 2 and the proof of Theorem 3. 
Proposition 3 enables us to determine K-resiliency of a system with m actuators by
verifying the positive definiteness of
(
m
K
)
matrices. Before proceeding further, we need to
establish a less obvious necessary condition for 1-resiliency.
Proposition 4: If B¯ is 1-resilient, then B¯B¯>  0.
Proof: Assume that B¯B¯> is not positive definite. Then, there exists x 6= 0 such that
xB¯B¯>x ≤ 0. Without loss of generality, assume we remove the last column C from B¯:
B¯B¯> =
[
B C
] [B>
C>
]
= BB> + CC>.
So F = BB> − CC> = B¯B¯> − 2CC>.
Then x>Fx = x>B¯B¯>x− 2x>CC>x ≤ 0− 2‖C>x‖2 ≤ 0, so F is not positive semidefinite.
By Proposition 3, B¯ is not 1-resilient. 
We have now addressed Problem 1, so we can start to think about Problem 2 and formalize
our initial intuition about overactuation.
Proposition 5: If B¯ is 1-resilient, then the system is overactuated.
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Proof: Assume B¯ ∈ Rn×m is not overactuated, then m ≤ n. After losing control of one
actuator, the remaining control matrix B has n rows and at most n − 1 columns. From
[17], the rank of a matrix is smaller than its smallest dimension, so rank(B) ≤ n − 1.
The rank of a product of matrices is smaller than the rank of each of the matrices [17], so
rank(BB>) ≤ rank(B). Thus, rank(BB>) ≤ n− 1.
Since BB> is a square matrix of size n, it is not invertible. Then, BB> is not positive
definite, so F = BB> − CC> is not positive definite either. According to Proposition 3, B¯
is not 1-resilient. 
It is intuitive that a system without redundancy among actuators cannot be resilient,
because a malfunctioning actuator cannot be counteracted. On the other hand, if there
are many copies of each actuator, then the system can lose control of one and still be
functioning. In between these extremes there is a minimum degree of overactuation required
for resiliency. Since adding actuators in practice comes with a cost, determining the minimal
size of a resilient matrix can help reducing that cost.
IV.2 Resiliency invariant and SVD
The degree of resiliency of a matrix is left unchanged when applying some basic transforma-
tions. Determining those will help our study of the minimal size of a resilient matrix.
Proposition 6: The degree of resiliency is not affected by left multiplication by an invertible
matrix.
Proof: Let B¯ be a K-resilient control matrix, and P an invertible matrix of adequate size.
The modified control matrix is B¯P = PB¯. We extract K columns of B¯P to create BP = PB
and CP = PC. Then,
F P = BP
(
BP
)> − CP (CP )>
=
(
PB
)(
PB
)> − (PC)(PC)>
= PBB>P> − PCC>P> = PFP>,
with F = BB> − CC>. Because P is invertible, we know from [18] that F  0 if and only
if F P  0. Using Proposition 3, we conclude that B¯P is also K-resilient. 
We note that rotations, permutations of columns and non-zero scaling are all invertible
operations, and thus do not change the degree of resiliency of a matrix. We can now simplify
the resiliency investigation with the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD).
Let B¯ ∈ Rn×m. The compact SVD [19] of B¯ is UDV , with U orthogonal of size n×n, D
a diagonal matrix gathering the n singular values of B¯, and V of size n×m with orthonormal
rows: V V > = I.
Proposition 7: The following statements hold for K ≥ 1:
(a) If B¯ is K-resilient, then V is also K-resilient.
(b) If V is K-resilient and B¯B¯>  0, then B¯ is K-resilient.
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Proof: For statement (a), assume that B¯ is K-resilient with K ≥ 1. Then, Proposition 4
states that B¯B¯>  0. Thus, the singular values of B¯ are non-zero [19]. Then, the diagonal
matrix D is invertible. The matrix U is orthogonal so it is also invertible. Therefore,
B¯ = UDV and V have the same degree of resiliency according to Proposition 6.
For statement (b), since B¯B¯>  0, the matrix D is invertible. Then, by Proposition 6
the matrix B¯ has the same degree of resiliency as V . 
Since V has orthonormal rows, we proceed to study the K-resiliency of V instead of
B¯. Let CV be any matrix formed with K columns taken from V , and BV the associated
remaining control matrix.
Proposition 8: The matrix V ∈ Rn×m with orthonormal rows is K-resilient if and only if
σ
C>V
max < 1√2 for all
(
m
K
)
possible CV matrices.
Proof: We extract K columns from V to create BV and CV and we investigate whether
FV := BVB
>
V − CVC>V is positive definite. Without loss of generality, V = [BV CV ], so
that V V > = BVB>V + CVC
>
V . The matrix V has orthonormal rows: V V
> = In. Then,
FV =V V
>−2CVC>V = In−2CVC>V . Let λ be an eigenvalue of FV . Then,
0 = det
(
λIn − FV
)
= det
(
λIn − In + 2CVC>V
)
= det
(
(λ− 1)In + 2CVC>V
)
=
(− 2)n det((1− λ
2
)
In − CVC>V
)
.
Let us define s := 1−λ
2
, so that s is an eigenvalue of CVC
>
V . Let x 6= 0 be an eigenvector such
that CVC
>
V x = sx. A left multiplication by x
> lead to ‖C>V x‖2 = s‖x‖2, so s ≥ 0.
Then,
√
s is a singular value of C>V . We note that λ > 0 if and only if
√
s < 1√
2
. Since
σ
C>V
max is the maximal singular value of C>V , FV  0 if and only if σC
>
V
max < 1√2 . 
Propositions 7 and 8 greatly simplify the investigation of the minimal size of resilient
matrices.
IV.3 1-resilient matrices
We will now establish a necessary condition determining the minimal size of a 1-resilient
control matrix.
Theorem 4: If B¯ ∈ Rn×m is 1-resilient, then m ≥ 2n+ 1.
Proof 1: Let B¯ ∈ Rn×m be 1-resilient. We extract the column i ∈ [m] from B¯ to form Ci,
while the remaining control matrix is called Bi.
We showed that Fi = BiB
>
i −CiC>i = B¯B¯>−2CiC>i in the proof of Proposition 4. Therefore,
det(Fi) = det
(
B¯B¯> − 2CiC>i
)
.
We now employ the matrix determinant lemma [17]:
det
(
B¯B¯> − 2CiC>i
)
=
(
1− 2C>i
(
B¯B¯>
)−1
Ci
)
det
(
B¯B¯>
)
.
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We sum the previous equations over i ∈ [m] to obtain
m∑
i=1
det(Fi) = det
(
B¯B¯>
)(
m− 2
m∑
i=1
C>i
(
B¯B¯>
)−1
Ci
)
.
Now, note that
m∑
i=1
C>i
(
B¯B¯>
)−1
Ci =
m∑
i=1
(B¯ei)
>(B¯B¯>)−1B¯ei = m∑
i=1
e>i B¯
>(B¯B¯>)−1B¯ei
= Tr
(
B¯>
(
B¯B¯>
)−1
B¯
)
= Tr
(
B¯B¯>
(
B¯B¯>
)−1)
= Tr(In) = n.
Therefore,
m∑
i=1
det(Fi) = det
(
B¯B¯>
)
(m− 2n). (6)
Following Proposition 4, we know that B¯B¯>  0, so its determinant is positive. According
to Proposition 3, we also have that for all i ∈ [m], det(Fi) > 0. Thus m − 2n > 0, i.e.,
m ≥ 2n+ 1. 
We also present an alternate proof of this theorem making use of Propositions 7 and 8.
Proof 2: Similarly as in Proposition 7, we employ the compact SVD on B¯ = UDV . From
the part (a) of Propositon 7 the matrix V ∈ Rn×m is 1-resilient. The columns of V are
denoted Cj and its orthonormal rows ri. Then,
m∑
j=1
‖Cj‖2 =
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
V 2ij =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
V 2ij =
n∑
i=1
‖ri‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1
= n. (7)
If max
j
‖Cj‖2 < nm , then it contradicts (7). From [18] we also know that the maximum
singular value of a column vector is its norm. We combine these results with the condition
of Proposition 8:
n
m
≤ max
j
‖Cj‖2 =
(
σC
>
max
)2
<
1
2
,
so m ≥ 2n+ 1 is a necessary condition for 1-resiliency. 
Theorem 4 shows that at least 2n+ 1 actuators are required to have a 1-resilient control
system in n dimensions. We will now prove that n× (2n + 1) is in fact the minimal size of
1-resilient matrices by producing such a matrix for all n ∈ N.
Proposition 9: For any n ∈ N, the matrix B¯ = [In In D] with the column D = 1√n [1 . . . 1]>
is 1-resilient.
Proof: We will use Theorem 2 and calculate max
h ∈ U
g(h) for the loss of any one actuator. First,
assume we lose control of one of the first 2n columns. Without loss of generality, we assume
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losing the column j of the first identity matrix, so C = ej. Then for h = (h1, . . . , hn) ∈ U,
we have
B>h =
(
h1, . . . , hj−1, hj+1, . . . , hn, h>,
n∑
i=1
hi√
n
)>
,
so ‖B>h‖2 =
n∑
i=1, 6=j
h2i +
n∑
i=1
h2i +
(
n∑
i=1
hi√
n
)2
= 2 ‖h‖2︸︷︷︸
= 1
−h2j +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
.
Then, g(h) < 0 ⇐⇒ ‖C>h‖2 < ‖B>h‖2 ⇐⇒ h2j < 2− h2j +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
⇐⇒ h2j < 1 +
1
2n
(
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
. (8)
If h2j = 1, then hi = 0 for all i 6= j because ‖h‖ = 1. Thus
∑
hi = 1, so (8) is true.
Otherwise, h2j < 1 and (8) is also true. Thus, for any h ∈ U, g(h) < 0.
The remaining case is when the system loses control of the last actuator. Then B = [In In]
and C = D. For any h ∈ U,
g(h) =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
hi√
n
∣∣∣∣∣−√2‖h‖ ≤
∑ |hi|√
n
−
√
2.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [20], we obtain
n∑
i=1
|hi| ≤
√√√√ n∑
i=1
|hi|2
√√√√ n∑
i=1
12 = ‖h‖√n = √n.
Then g(h) ≤ 1 −√2 < 0. Therefore, in both cases max
h ∈ U
g(h) < 0. From Proposition 2,
the control matrix B¯ is 1-resilient. 
To sum up, we showed that the minimal size of a 1-resilient control matrix is n×(2n+1).
We will now investigate sufficient conditions allowing to generate 1-resilient control matrices
by making use of Proposition 8.
Proposition 10: Any matrix V ∈ Rn×m where m ≥ 2n + 1 which has orthonormal rows
and whose columns have all the same norm, is 1-resilient.
Proof: Since the columns C of matrix V have the same norm, equation (7) implies ‖C‖2 = n
m
.
The maximal singular value of a column vector is its norm [18], so σC
>
max = ‖C‖ =
√
n
m
. Since
m ≥ 2n+ 1, we obtain
n
m
≤ 1
2
− 1
2m
<
1
2
, i.e., σC
>
max <
1√
2
.
Then, Proposition 8 states that V is 1-resilient. 
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Intuitively, the columns of V having the same norm means that the actuators are equally
powerful, whereas the rows having the same norm means that all the states are equally
actuated. Furthermore, the orthogonality of rows enforces the necessary condition for
1-resiliency of Proposition 4 by making V V > positive definite.
With Proposition 10 we can now easily generate 1-resilient matrices for any size n. For
instance,
[
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 −1 −1 −1
]
and
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1
 are 1-resilient.
We now wish to expand our minimal size investigation to higher degrees of resiliency.
IV.4 Higher degree of resiliency
We first generalize Proposition 9 to K-resiliency. Let us define the matrices B¯p = [In . . . In D]
composed of p identity matrices and a column vector D = 1√
n
[1 . . . 1]>.
Proposition 11: The matrix B¯2K is K-resilient.
Proof: We calculate max
h ∈ U
g(h) for all possible losses of K actuators.
First, assume the system loses control of K columns belonging all to the identity matrices.
Without loss of generality we assume losing one column per matrix. The index of the column
lost in the ith identity matrix is ji ∈ [n]. These columns form the matrix C =
[
ej1 . . . ejK
]
,
while B is the remaining control matrix. Then, for h =
(
h1, . . . , hn
) ∈ U, we have
C>h =
(
hj1 , . . . , hjK
)
so ‖C>h‖2 =
K∑
i=1
h2ji ,
‖B>h‖2 = 2K
n∑
i=1
h2i −
K∑
i=1
h2ji +
(
n∑
i=1
hi√
n
)2
= 2K −
K∑
i=1
h2ji +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
.
From (5) we have g(h) = ‖C>h‖ − ‖B>h‖. Then,
g(h) < 0⇐⇒
K∑
i=1
h2ji < 2K −
K∑
i=1
h2ji +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
⇐⇒
K∑
i=1
h2ji < K +
1
2n
(
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
. (9)
If j1 = . . . = jK , and h = ej1 , then (9) simplifies into K < K +
1
2n
, which is true. In all
other cases, the left hand side of (9) is strictly smaller than K, so the inequality also holds
true. Overall g(h) < 0 for all h ∈ U and all choice of columns j1, . . . , jK ∈ [n].
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The other possible case is when B¯2K loses K − 1 columns among the identity matrices
and the last column D. Then,
g(h) =
√√√√K−1∑
i=1
h2ji +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
−
√√√√2K − K−1∑
i=1
h2ji .
Since ‖h‖ = 1, h2ji ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [K-1]. We use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [20](
n∑
i=1
hi
)2
≤
(
n∑
i=1
h2i
)(
n∑
i=1
12
)
= ‖h‖2 n = n.
Then,
g(h) ≤
√
K − 1 + 1
n
n−
√
2K − (K − 1) ≤
√
K −√K + 1 < 0.
Therefore, in both cases max
h ∈ U
g(h) < 0. Proposition 2 then states that B¯2K is K-resilient. 
We can also extend Proposition 10 to 2-resilient matrices with a consequential increase
in the calculations required.
Proposition 12: Any matrix V ∈ Rn×m where m ≥ 4n + 1 which has orthonormal rows
and whose columns have all the same norm, with at least two columns being collinear, is
2-resilient.
Proof: Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 10 the columns have a squared norm of
‖C‖2 = n
m
. We extract any two columns C1 and C2 from V to form C, the remaining part
of V is named B. Since C =
[
C1 C2
]
, we have CC> = C1C>1 + C2C
>
2 .
The singular values σC
>
of C> are defined as the square roots of the eigenvalues s of
CC>. Therefore we calculate s =
(
σC
>)2
to use Proposition 8. From the matrix determinant
lemma [17],
0 = det
(
sIn − CC>
)
= det
(
sIn − C1C>1 − C2C>2
)
=
(
1− C>2
(
sIn − C1C>1
)−1
C2
)
det
(
sIn − C1C>1
)
.
If det
(
sIn − C1C>1
)
= 0, then the resulting eigenvalue is either 0 or ‖C1‖2 = nm by [18]. To
investigate when the other term goes to zero, we develop the inverse into a Neumann series
[18] for s such that
∥∥∥C1C>1s ∥∥∥ < 1:
s
(
sIn − C1C>1
)−1
=
(
In − C1C
>
1
s
)−1
=
∞∑
p=0
(
C1C
>
1
s
)p
(10)
= I +
∞∑
p=1
1
sp
C1
(
C>1 C1
)p−1
C>1 = I +
C1C
>
1
s
∞∑
p=1
(
‖C1‖2
s
)p−1
= I +
C1C
>
1
s
1
1− ‖C1‖2
s
= I +
C1C
>
1
s− ‖C1‖2 .
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Then,
(
1− C>2
(
sIn − C1C>1
)−1
C2
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ s = C>2 s
(
sIn − C1C>1
)−1
C2
⇐⇒ C>2
(
I +
C1C
>
1
s− ‖C1‖2
)
C2 = s = ‖C2‖2 +
(
C>1 C2
)2
s− ‖C1‖2
⇐⇒ s2 − (‖C1‖2 + ‖C2‖2)s+ ‖C1‖2‖C2‖2 − (C>1 C2)2 = 0.
Recall that ‖C1‖2 = ‖C2‖2 = nm . Then the previous equation becomes
s2 − 2n
m
s+
n2
m2
− (C>1 C2)2 = 0.
The maximal root of this quadratic equation is
smax =
n
m
+
∣∣C>1 C2∣∣. (11)
This expansion is only valid for the case where s satisfies
∥∥∥C1C>1s ∥∥∥ < 1. We note that
‖C1C>1 ‖ = λmax(C1C>1 ) = ‖C1‖2 = nm , from [18]. Therefore, in the other case s ≤ nm . From
(11) we deduce that smax is the maximal eigenvalue of CC
>.
The matrix C maximizing smax is the one composed of two collinear columns of V . Indeed,
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
∣∣C>1 C2∣∣ ≤ ‖C1‖ ‖C2‖, and the equality only happens when
C1 and C2 are collinear. In that case, smax =
2n
m
.
Then, the resiliency condition of Proposition 8 is equivalent to 2smax < 1, i.e., m ≥ 4n+1.
Thus, V is 2-resilient. 
Note that two collinear columns of same norm are either the same or opposites. Propo-
sition 12 thus deals with the case where at least one actuator of the system is doubled.
With the guidelines provided by Proposition 12 we produce an example of a 2-resilient
matrix V of size 2× 10:
V =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
]
.
With Proposition 11 we can generate K-resilient matrices of size n × (2Kn + 1). For
K = 1 it corresponds to n× (2n+ 1), which is the minimal size for 1-resilient matrices. For
K = 2, we obtain a matrix with 4n + 1 columns, which is consistent with the minimal size
detailed in Proposition 12.
In order to determine the minimal size of a K-resilient matrix, with K ≥ 2, the only
missing result is an equivalent of Theorem 4 for higher degrees of resiliency.
However, the process employed in the first proof of Theorem 4 does not scale well with
the degree of resiliency. Indeed, the fact that
∑
det(Fi) = 0, when m = 2n cannot be
generalized to K ≥ 2.
As for the second proof, the calculations are already significantly more complex for K = 2
as can be seen in the proof of Proposition 12. Without the assumption of same column norm
for the case K = 2 the calculations do not even reach a conclusion. For K ≥ 3, the
calculations become even more cumbersome. The Neumann series (10) becomes
s
(
sIn −
K−1∑
j=1
CjC
>
j
)−1
=
∞∑
p=0
(
K−1∑
j=1
CjC
>
j
s
)p
.
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We would then need the multinomial formula to calculate each term of the series:(
K−1∑
j=1
CjC
>
j
)p
=
∑
i1+...+iK−1=p
(
p
i1, ..., iK−1
)K−1∏
j=1
(
CjC
>
j
)ij .
Proceeding to the separation of
(
CjC
>
j
)ij into a scalar part with the power ij − 1 and a
matrix part like we did for K = 2 is still possible but brings numerous cross-terms that
did not appear for K = 2. Because of the complexity of the calculations for K ≥ 2, we
were unable to obtain a simple necessary condition on the minimal size of such K-resilient
matrices.
Remark: If we based our intuition about the minimal size of K-resilient matrices on Theo-
rem 4 and on Proposition 11, then we might conjecture a minimal size of n× (2Kn+ 1) for
K-resilient matrices B¯.
Such a conjecture holds for 2-resilient matrices with a state dimension n = 1. Indeed,
let us consider B¯ =
[
b1 b2 b3 b4
]
. Without loss of generality, assume that b3 and b4 have a
greater absolute value than b1 and b2. When losing control of the last two columns we form
B =
[
b1 b2
]
and C =
[
b3 b4
]
. Then, F = BB> − CC> = b21 + b22 − b23 − b24 ≤ 0. Therefore,
there are no 2-resilient matrices of size 1 × 4. The minimal size of a 2-resilient matrix for
n = 1 is then 1× 5, since [1 1 1 1 1] is 2-resilient.
However, we are able to generate 2-resilient matrices of size n× 4n for n = 6 and n = 8,
and even of size n × (4n − 2) for n = 12. Since these matrices are of consequent size, they
can be found in the Appendix A. We will now provide the intuition that led us to these
counterexamples.
We consider a matrix V ∈ Rn×m with orthogonal rows whose only elements are ±1.
Obviously, all columns have the same norm: ‖C‖2 = n, and the maximal singular value
of CC> defined in (11) becomes smax =
∣∣C>1 C2∣∣ + n, with the notations from the proof of
Proposition 12. To build a 2-resilient matrix of minimal size, we need to minimize smax.
Indeed, for these matrices the resiliency condition of Proposition 8 becomes 2smax < m. For
a small smax, we should then be able to have a small number m of columns. To minimize
smax, V should not have any collinear columns, because they would maximize the scalar
product
∣∣C>1 C2∣∣, as seen in the proof of Proposition 12.
There are 2n different vectors composed of n elements±1. These vectors are only collinear
with the vector of opposite sign. Thus, there are 2n−1 of such non-collinear vectors. To build
a matrix with 4n columns, we then require 2n−1 ≥ 4n. The minimal dimension realizing
that condition is n = 6. We believe that it is impossible to build a 2-resilient matrix of 4n
columns for n ≤ 5.
We propose two ways of generating a 2-resilient matrix with 4n columns for n ≥ 6. The
first approach consists in producing all the non-collinear vectors and then selecting 4n of
them to create a matrix with orthogonal rows. With this approach, we were able to produce
a 2-resilient matrix of size 6× 24, as can be seen in Appendix A.
The other approach uses the Hadamard matrices [21]. They are square and orthogonal
matrices composed of only ±1. By carefully selecting n rows of a 4n×4n Hadamard matrix,
it is possible to have 4n non-collinear columns. We extracted 8 chosen rows of a 32 × 32
Hadamard matrix and we built a 2-resilient matrix of minimal size 8× 32 in Appendix A.
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In order to generate a 2-resilient matrix with an even lower degree of overactuation, the
maximal scalar product in (11) must be made even smaller. We succeeded by taking n = 12
and selecting n partial rows from a 4n×4n Hadamard matrix in order to obtain a 2-resilient
matrix of size n× (4n− 2) presented in the Appendix A.
Therefore the above conjecture is wrong. Its demise also explains why the proof of
Theorem 4 cannot be extended to higher degrees of resiliency.
It is now time to tackle Problem 3, the generation of a control law for resilient systems.
V Control synthesis
The definition of resilient reachability asks for the existence of a control law. A natural
follow-up question is thus one of designing such a control law. For a driftless resilient system
following the state equation x˙(t) = Bu(t)+Cw(t), we want u to drive the state to the target
in spite of the undesirable input w. As noted at the beginning of the paper, if matrix B was
invertible, the control law u = −B−1Cw would cancel w. However, B might not even be a
square matrix. Instead, we design the control law using the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of
B [18]. An additional challenge in generating the adequate control law is to ensure that for
all w ∈ W , the control u stays in its set U . To do so, we make use of the resilient reachability
conditions previously established and require the positive definiteness of F = BB> − CC>.
Theorem 5: If F  0, then there exists α > 0 such that
u(t) := B>
(
BB>
)−1(− Cw(t) + α(xgoal − x(t))) (12)
drives the resilient system (4) to its target ball G, and u ∈ U for any w ∈ W .
Proof: We need to prove that u is well-defined, stays in U at all time and drives the system
to the target. We assumed that measurements of the undesirable inputs are available in
real-time and the state is completely observable, so the controller has access to w(t) and
x(t). Since F = BB>−CC>  0, obviously BB>  0, so BB> is invertible, and the control
law is well-defined.
If we plug the control law (12) into the state equation (4) we obtain
x˙ = BB>
(
BB>
)−1(− Cw + α(xgoal − x))+ Cw
= α
(
xgoal − x
)
.
The solution is x(t) = xgoal+e
−αtd, with d = x(0)−xgoal. Since α > 0, the state x converges
globally exponentially to the target. Therefore, the control law is successful.
We need to prove that for all w ∈ W , we have u ∈ U , i.e., that ‖u‖L2 ≤ 1. Note that
xgoal−x(t) = −e−αtd, and define υ(t) := Cw(t) +αe−αtd, so that u(t) = −B>
(
BB>
)−1
υ(t).
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Then,
‖u‖2L2 =
∫ T
0
‖u(t)‖2Rmdt =
∫ T
0
u(t)>u(t) dt
=
∫ T
0
υ(t)>
(
BB>
)−>
B B>
(
BB>
)−1
υ(t) dt
=
∫ T
0
υ(t)>
(
BB>
)−1
υ(t) dt.
To simplify, let P :=
(
BB>
)−1  0, and expand υ(t) as
υ(t)>Pυ(t) = w(t)>C>PCw(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= T1
+w(t)>C>Pαe−αtd︸ ︷︷ ︸
= T2
+αe−αtd>PCw(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= T3
+α2d>e−αtPe−αtd︸ ︷︷ ︸
= T4
= T1 + T2 + T3 + T4. (13)
The first term T1 is the most complicated to bound. From the Woodbury formula [18],
we learn that
(
I +C>F−1C
)
is invertible, and we simplify the inverse of BB> = F +CC>.
Since F is invertible,
P =
(
F + CC>
)−1
= F−1 − F−1C(I + C>F−1C)−1C>F−1.
Now we define D := C>F−1C. Then, C>PC = D −D(I +D)−1D.
By expanding
(
I +D
)−1(
I +D
)
= I, we easily obtain
(
I +D
)−1
D = I− (I +D)−1, so that
C>PC = D −D +D(I +D)−1.
Similarly, from
(
I +D
)(
I +D
)−1
= I, we finally obtain C>
(
BB>
)−1
C = I − (I +D)−1.
Let λ be an eigenvalue of C>
(
BB>
)−1
C. Then
0 = det
(
λI − C>(BB>)−1C) = det (λI − I + (I +D)−1)
= det
(
(λ− 1)(I +D)(I +D)−1 + I(I +D)−1)
= det
(
(λ− 1)(I +D) + I) det(I +D)−1.
From the Woodbury formula we know that (I + D) is invertible, so det(I + D))−1 6= 0. If
λ = 1, then det(I) = 0, which is absurd. Thus λ 6= 1, so we can divide by (λ− 1):
0 = det
(
I +D +
1
λ− 1I
)
= det
( λ
λ− 1I +D
)
= (−1)m det
( −λ
λ− 1I −D
)
.
Since D is symmetric, its eigenvalues are nonnegative, so −λ
λ−1 ≥ 0. Since C>
(
BB>
)−1
C is
also symmetric, λ ≥ 0. Therefore λ − 1 < 0, i.e. λ < 1. Define λM < 1 as the maximal
eigenvalue of C>
(
BB>
)−1
C. Then,∫ T
0
T1dt =
∫ T
0
w(t)>C>
(
BB>
)−1
Cw(t) dt ≤
∫ T
0
w(t)>λMw(t) dt = λM‖w‖2L2 ≤ λM . (14)
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We can now tackle the integral of the second term of (13):∫ T
0
T2 dt =
∫ T
0
αw(t)>C>Pe−αtd dt = α
∫ T
0
w(t)>e−αt dt C>Pd. (15)
Then, we calculate the norm of the integral term in (15) and use the Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality to bound it:
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
w(t)>e−αtdt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Rm
=
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(∫ T
0
wi(t)e−αtdt
)2
≤
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(∫ T
0
w2i (t)dt
)(∫ T
0
e−2αtdt
)
≤
√√√√[e−2αt
−2α
]T
0
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
w2i (t)dt =
√
1− e−2αT
2α
‖w‖L2 .
Thus, ∫ T
0
T2 dt ≤
√
α
2
‖C>Pd‖ ‖w‖L2 . (16)
The same process is applied to T3, and results in the same upper bound:∫ T
0
T3 dt ≤
√
α
2
‖d>PC‖ ‖w‖L2 . (17)
We also simplify the integral of the fourth term of (13):
∫ T
0
T4 =
∫ T
0
α2d>e−αtPe−αtd dt = α2d>Pd
∫ T
0
e−2αt dt = α2d>Pd
[
e−2αt
−2α
]T
0
=
α
2
d>Pd
(
1− e−2αT ) ≤ α
2
d>Pd. (18)
Then, we combine (14), (16), (17) and (18):
‖u‖2L2 ≤
α
2
d>Pd+ 2
√
α
2
‖C>Pd‖+ λM . (19)
Since λM < 1, and d, P and C are constant, we can choose α small enough so that the right
hand side of (19) is smaller than 1, which finally leads to ‖u‖2L2 ≤ 1, i.e. u ∈ U . 
The proof of Theorem 5 provides a constructive method of finding α satisfying the claim
of the theorem. For instance, an appropriate α is given by
α = 2
(√
b2 + (1− λM)a− b
)2
a2
, with a = d>Pd and b = ‖C>Pd‖. (20)
Theorem 5 gives an intuitive validation of the work developed in the previous sections.
Indeed, we established that resilient reachability implies F  0. From Theorem 5, we see
that such a condition is indeed sufficient to build a control law of the form (12).
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The positive definiteness of F brings two results. The part BB>  0 guarantees the
existence of u. But BB> is more than just positive definite, in fact BB>  CC> with a
slight abuse of notation. This relation ensures that u of the form (12) remains within the
bounds of U even when w is maximal.
We finally briefly return to a general system (2) with possible drift. We will show that
the same control law as in the driftless case can be used if the natural dynamics x˙ = Ax are
not overly unstable. The intuition is that the magnitude of u exceeds w, and that excess
of magnitude can be used to counteract instability to a certain extent. We formalize our
intuition in Theorem 6.
First, let us introduce the set
A :=
{
α > 0 :
α
2
d>Pd+
√
2α‖C>Pd‖ ≤ 1− λM
}
, (21)
with λM = max
(
λ(C>
(
BB>
)−1
C)
)
< 1. Set A is non-empty, as explained at the end of the
proof of Theorem 5. Since d = x(0)− xgoal, the case d = 0 implies that the system starts at
the target and no control law is needed. Otherwise, d 6= 0 and P = (BB>)−1  0 whenever
F  0. Therefore, d>Pd > 0, so the set A is bounded from above if F  0. We can now
define α∗ := maxA, and easily compute it from (20).
Theorem 6: If F  0 and if max(Re(λ(A))) < α∗, then the control law
u(t) := B>
(
BB>
)−1(− Cw(t) + α∗(xgoal − x(t)))
drives the resilient system (2) to its target ball G, and u ∈ U for any w ∈ W .
Proof: For the same reasons as in the proof of Theorem 5, u is well-defined, and u ∈ U
because α∗ ∈ A. The only difference concerns the effect of the control law on the trajectory.
Indeed, when plugging (12) into (2), we obtain:
x˙ = Ax+ α(xgoal − x) = (A− αI)x+ αxgoal.
Thus, x(t) = xgoal + e
(A−αI)t. Then, the state converges towards xgoal if and only if
max(Re(λ(A− αI))) < 0, i.e., if α > max(Re(λ(A))). And u ∈ U if and only if α ≤ α∗. 
Note that the value of α∗ depends on d, the distance between the initial state and the
target. Therefore, the further away the target is, the less instability can be counteracted
by the control law. If the system is overly unstable, i.e., α∗ < max(Re(λ(A))), then the
proposed control law cannot drive the state to the target.
From Theorem 6 we can easily derive a sufficient condition for resiliency and confirm our
intuition about stable systems.
Corollary: If A is Hurwitz and B¯ is K-resilient, then the system x˙ = Ax + B¯u is also
K-resilient.
Proof: Since B¯ is K-resilient, we can remove any K columns of B¯ and have F  0. We
choose a target ball G. As in the proof of Theorem 6, the set (21) has a maximal bound
α∗ > 0. Since A is Hurwitz, its eigenvalues have a negative real part, so α∗ > max(Re(λ(A))).
Thus, the control law (12) drives the state to the target ball. Therefore, the system is also
K-resilient. 
We have here obtained a simple resiliency condition for non-driftless systems. We now
proceed to computationally confirm the above theoretical results.
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VI Numerical example
To validate our theory, we consider the ADMIRE fighter jet model developed by the Swedish
Defense Research Agency [22]. The ADMIRE model has already served as an application
case in several control frameworks [23], [24].
We explore three different scenarios featuring the fighter jet. First, we investigate the
resiliency of the simplified model used in [23]. We also use this model as a benchmark to
compare our approach with a robust control method. We finally study the resiliency of a
more advanced driftless dynamics model of the aircraft.
Figure 1: The ADMIRE fighter jet model. Image modified from [24].
VI.1 Resiliency of a fighter jet
We consider only four of the actuators of the jet: the canard, the left and right elevons and
the rudder, as depicted on Figure 1. With these control surfaces, the pilot can directly affect
the angular acceleration in roll, pitch and yaw.
The nominal linearized dynamics of the jet established in [23] are x˙ = Ax+ B¯u, with the
state vector x gathering the angular velocities in roll, pitch and yaw (rad/s):
x =
pq
r
 A =
−0.9967 0 0.61760 −0.5057 0
−0.0939 0 −0.2127

B¯ =
 0 −4.2423 4.2423 1.48711.6532 −1.2735 −1.2735 0.0024
0 −0.2805 0.2805 −0.8823
 .
Note that the system is naturally stable: the eigenvalues of A have negative real parts. The
inputs of the system are the deflections of the control surfaces: uc for the canard wings,
ure and ule for the right and left elevons, and ur for the rudder. They are mechanically
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constrained:
u =

uc
ure
ule
ur
 with uc ∈ [−25, 55] pi180 ,
ure, ule, ur ∈ [−30, 30] pi180 .
(22)
Consider the scenario in which, after sustaining damage (e.g., during air combat), one
of the control surfaces of the fighter jet stops responding to the commands. This surface is
now producing undesirable inputs. The pilot wants to minimize the aircraft roll, pitch and
yaw rates, so the target is a ball of radius 0.1 centered around the origin, x = 0.
By looking at the matrix B¯ we can build our intuition on the resiliency of the system.
The first column represents the effect of the canard and only modifies the pitch rate of
the aircraft. This actuator can be counteracted by the combined actions of both elevons,
because 1.2735 + 1.2735 > 1.6532. The elevons can counteract each other in terms of
roll but doing so would induce a high pitching moment that cannot be counteracted. The
yawing moment produced by the rudder cannot be counteracted by the other actuators:
0.8823 > 0.2805 + 0.2805. Therefore, our intuition states that the fighter jet is only resilient
to the loss of control authority over the canard.
We check whether the matrix F = BB> − CC> is positive definite for each of the four
possible actuator losses. Table 1 gathers the minimal eigenvalues of F for the four cases. As
predicted by our intuition, the jet is only resilient to the loss of control authority over the
canard.
Table 1: Minimal eigenvalue of F for each actuator losses
Loss of control of: minλ(F )
Canards 0.51
Right elevon -8.5
Left elevon -8.5
Rudder -1.0
We study more in-depth the loss of control over the canard with Theorem 6. We reuse the
notations employed in the proof and after some calculations we obtain: λM = 0.8426 < 1,
α∗ = 0.0343 > 0, max(Re(λ(A))) = −0.259 < α∗, so the control law (12) should work.
We simulate our system on MATLAB with ode45. The undesirable input follows a
uniform distribution between the bounds of uc defined in (22). As predicted, the state
converges exponentially from x0 = (1, 1, 1) rad/s to the origin, as shown by the blue curve
in Figure 2. Without a control input, the state does not converge to the origin, as shown in
red.
If the pilot loses control authority over any one of the elevons, then F is not positive
definite, but BB> is invertible. The control law (12) is still well-defined, so it can be
implemented, but for some w ∈ W the control is not admissible: uw /∈ U .
If the pilot loses control of the rudder, BB> is not invertible, so the control law (12) is
not well-defined. The jet cannot be guaranteed to be able to reach the desired target.
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Figure 2: Distance of the state from the origin.
VI.2 Comparison with robust control
To illustrate the strength of our approach in the considered scenario, we compare our results
with those of classical robust control.
Let us first recall the differences in assumptions between robust control and resilient
reachability. A control law is said to be robust if it drives the state to the target whatever
the disturbance is, i.e., there exists a control law u such that for all undesirable input w, we
have x(T ) ∈ G. On the other hand, resilient reachability considers a controller aware of the
undesirable input, i.e., for all w, there exists a control law uw such that x(T ) ∈ G.
In our setting, the undesirable input is produced by an actuator belonging to the system.
It is thus reasonable to assume that the actuator input can be measured. The resilient
controller has access to more information than a robust controller. We thus expect the
resilient controller to perform better than the robust controller.
We choose the robust control approach developed in [12]. Its objective is to approximate
the closed-loop reach set X [T ] with internal and external ellipsoids. The reach set gathers
the states xgoal ∈ Rn for each of which there exists a control law such that, whatever the
undesirable input is, x(T ) ∈ B(xgoal, µ) for a certain radius µ ≥ 0.
We compare the precision of our approach with [12] based on the size of the smallest
target ball guaranteed to be reached. The application case is the ADMIRE model with drift
studied in the previous subsection VI.1. We assume that the pilot loses control authority
over the canards.
The resilient inputs have L2 bounds. However, the robust control inputs u must be
bounded by an ellipsoid. To make the comparison as fair as possible, we choose the maximal
ellipsoid within the actuators range (22). For the details of its construction we refer the
reader to Appendix B.
We now need to calculate the radius µ of the smallest robustly reachable target. We
compute only the tight ellipsoidal internal approximation of the closed-loop reach set:
E(x−(T ), X−(T )) ⊆ X [T ]. We numerically obtained µ = 5.9. Thus, the robust control law
(with standard ellipsoidal approximations of the reachable set) can only guarantee to reach
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a target state within a radius of 5.9. The initial state x0 = (1, 1, 1) was already inside that
ball. Thus, the robust control cannot even guarantee that the state will get closer to the
target than its initial state.
On the other hand, we know that the jet is resilient to the loss of control over the
canards. Therefore, a target ball of any size is resiliently reachable. By having access to the
undesirable input, a controller ensuring resilient reachability is then more effective than a
robust controller.
In the major part of this work, we have considered driftless systems. We will now proceed
to illustrate the developed theory for these systems.
VI.3 A driftless model
The aircraft model used as previous example is very convenient for our study because of the
linearization and the overactuation. However, to render the dynamics driftless, we needed
a more in-depth analysis of the model. We obtained the original simulation code of the
ADMIRE model from [25].
For our purposes, we removed the states representing the sensor dynamics and those not
directly affected by the controls from the initial 28-states model [22]. We also removed four
of the sixteen inputs as they are negligible compared to the other inputs.
The simulation generates a pair of matrices A and B¯ following the nominal dynamics
(1). The effect of the matrix A is negligible compared to B¯, when considering the states
x = (Vt, q, r), i.e., the jet speed, pitch and yaw rates. Thus, we approximate their dynamics
by a driftless system, setting A = 0.
Since the jet has a single engine, it is not resilient to its loss. For our study, we assume
a guaranteed authority over the thrust command, except for the afterburners. In the model
the thrust command actuator also encompasses the afterburners. Since they account for only
20% of the thrust, the corresponding column in B¯ is scaled by 20%.
At Mach 0.75 and altitude 3000 m, the control matrix is
B¯> =

−2.7 7.1 −1.9
−2.7 7.1 1.9
−1.0 −7.7 −1.1
−1.8 −13 −3.0
−1.8 −13 3.0
−1.0 −7.7 1.1
−1.9 0.0 −11
−0.8 −0.5 0
−4.3 −0.7 0
1.2 0 0
−71 1.2 −710
−113 −882 0

right canard,
left canard,
right outboard elevon,
right inboard elevon,
left inboard elevon,
left outboard elevon,
rudder,
leading edge flaps,
landing gear,
afterburner,
yaw thrust vectoring,
pitch thrust vectoring.
Each row of B¯> represents the effect of the actuator written on the right. All the values of
the inputs are in radians except for the landing gear and the afterburner which are between 0
and 1. This control matrix is not 1-resilient, because the thrust vectoring inputs are several
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orders of magnitude greater than any of the other inputs. For the same reason, the system
is resilient to the loss of any one of the other ten actuators.
Simply removing thrust vectoring capabilities does not render the system 1-resilient; the
control of the yaw rate would then primarily depend on the rudder, hence rendering the
aircraft not resilient to the loss of the rudder.
Instead of removing the thrust vectoring actuators, if their range of motion is restricted to
1.4% of their current range, then B¯ becomes resilient. Indeed, the thrust vectoring actuators
can now be counteracted by the rudder and the elevons. Since we reduced the magnitude
of two columns of B¯, we also had to verify that the driftless hypothesis was still valid by
comparing the effects of A and B¯.
We showed how to make the fighter jet resilient in terms of speed, pitch and yaw rates, by
scaling down thrust vectoring and having a guaranteed thrust. The resiliency improvement
by reducing the thrust vectoring might seem counterintuitive. Yet, it is explained by the fact
that these actuators were too powerful to be balanced if they became uncontrolled. While
the new system is resilient, its capabilities have been reduced. For instance, reaching a target
(while undamaged) would take significantly more time for the new resilient system than for
the old one.
The resiliency analysis developed for this fighter jet is affected by several limitations of
the current state of our theory. The first and obvious limitation comes from the driftless
hypothesis but is justified here by the difference of magnitude between the drift and controlled
dynamics. The most limiting hypothesis is that the controls are bounded by a L2 norm.
Indeed, each actuator is independent of the others so a joint bound may not be appropriate.
The structure of U from (3) also assumes that each actuator has a symmetric range of
functioning, which makes sense for the rudder, for instance, but not for the landing gear
which can only be stored or deployed. These two main limitations lead our future work
directions.
VII Conclusions and Future Work
This paper introduced the notion of resilient systems that can withstand the loss of control
over any single or multiple actuators and still guarantee to drive the state to its target.
We established necessary and sufficient conditions to verify the resiliency of a system. We
determined the minimal number of actuators required for 1- and 2-resilient systems. Further
developing the theory, we established several methods to design resilient systems of any
dimension and of any degree of resiliency. We then focused on control law synthesis for
driftless and non-driftless systems. We proceeded to illustrate our results on a model of a
fighter jet.
There are four promising avenues of future work. Most of our work so far has concerned
driftless systems. We aim to extend the theory to a broader class of dynamics. Another
direction of work concerns the type of bounds on the inputs. In this work we considered a
bound on the total actuation effort of all the actuators over time. Instead, we want each
actuator to have its own bound enforced at every instant. Another useful future step is
to establish a metric quantifying the resiliency of a given system, for example, comparing
the time required to reach a target with and without loss of control over actuators. Our
24
fourth direction of future work is to investigate more complex control specifications, e.g.,
reach-avoid, where the system seeks to avoid parts of the state space while reaching a target.
Appendices
A Examples of 2-resilient matrices
The following matrix B¯ of size 6× 24 is 2-resilient:
B¯ =

1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1
1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1
 .
The matrix B¯ of size 8×32 is 2-resilient: B¯> =

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1
1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1
1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1
−1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1
1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1
1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1
1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1
−1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1
−1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1
1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1
−1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1
−1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1
1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1
1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1
1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1

.
25
The following matrix B¯ of size 12× 46 is 2-resilient:
B¯> =

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
−1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1
−1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
−1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1
−1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1
−1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1
−1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1
−1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
−1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
−1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1
−1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1
−1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1
−1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1

.
These matrices were constructed using the methods described at the end of Section IV.
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B Comparison with Robust Control
We provide further details of the computation of the ellipsoidal internal bounds
E(x−(T ), X−(T )) ⊆ X [T ] on the reach set in Section VI.2.
The center x−(t) of each of the internal ellipsoids follows the dynamics
x˙− = Ax− +Buc + Cwc, with x−(0) = x0 ∈ Rn, (23)
and uc and wc the respective centers of the control ellipsoid and of the disturbance ellipsoid.
The disturbance ellipsoid is W = E(wc, Q), with its center wc := 12(wmax + wmin). The
disturbance bounds wmin and wmax are the mechanical bounds of the uncontrolled actuator
defined in (22). We consider loss of control over only one actuator. Thus, Q is a scalar, so
Q(w − wc)2 ≤ 1 and wmin ≤ w ≤ wmax. Hence, Q = 4(wmax−wmin)2 .
Defining the control ellipsoid is more complicated. To have a fair comparison with the
results of our paper, we would need to enforce L2 bounds on the inputs. However, this is
not possible in the framework of [12]: it allows only for time-invariant ellipsoidal sets of
admissible control inputs. Let us find a compromise. We start from the bounds defined in
(3): ‖u‖L2 ≤ 1 and ‖w‖L2 ≤ 1. So, we want to enforce∫ T
0
‖u(t)‖2dt ≤ 1 and
∫ T
0
‖w(t)‖2dt ≤ 1,
which can be done by choosing ‖u(t)‖2, ‖w(t)‖2 ≤ 1
T
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. What matters here
is the fact that ‖u(t)‖ and ‖w(t)‖ have the same bound. Therefore, we choose to limit each
input to the smallest of the two intervals [wmin, wmax] and the interval from (22). The control
ellipsoid is then E(uc, P), with its center uc := 12(umax + umin) and a diagonal shape matrix
P with Pii = min
{
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(uimax−uimin)
2 , Q
}
.
The differential equation for the shape matrix X−(t) of the internal ellipsoid [12] is
X˙− = AX− +X−A> +
√
X−S1(t)B
√
P +
√
PB>S1(t)
√
X>−
+µ
(√
X−S2(t) + S2(t)
√
X>−
)
− pi(t)X− − CQC>√
pi(t)
,
(24)
with X−(0) = X0. The functions pi, S1 and S2 are defined as follows for a given vector
l ∈ Rn:
l(t) := eA
>tl pi(t) :=
√
l(t)>CQC>l(t)
S1(t)B
√
P :=
√
l(t)>BPB>l(t)
l(t)>X−l(t)
√
X− S2(t) :=
‖l(t)‖√
l(t)>X−l(t)
√
X−.
We can now compute the trajectory of the center of the ellipsoid x−(t) with (23), and
the evolution of the shape matrix X−(t) of the ellipsoid with (24) and (25). When the radius
µ of the target ball is too small for the target to be reached, then the shape matrix X− is
not positive definite. We investigated for the smallest µ such that X−(T )  0, and found
µ = 5.9. Therefore, the smallest target ball the robust method guarantees to reach has a
radius of 5.9.
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